The information and communications technologies (ICTs) revolution in the Arab world coincides with an era of political turbulence marked by a wave of Islamic political activism, the reinflamed Palestinian-Israeli conflict and, most dramatically, the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States and the subsequent American ‘war on terrorism.’ All of this is taking place against a background of globalization and its profound multiple effects on Arab societies. This essay begins with a sketch of ICT development in the Arab world. It contends that ICT is accelerating the erosion of the state’s ability to frame identities and loyalties and is opening the door to transnational political action. Exogenous transnational action affects Arab societies, but transnational forces arising in the Arab and Muslim worlds can have global effects, with attacks on American territory serving as an extreme example. The essay goes on to describe the changing political terrain in the Arab world and the development of networks as powerful structures for contestation, with attention being drawn to the particular successes of Islamist networks. American assertiveness after 11 September has deepened the contradictions in Arab politics and society. The essay concludes with ten propositions concerning the relationships between ICT, political identities, networks and American ‘imperial’ behaviour.

Introduction

The latest information revolution in the Arab world began in the mid-1990s with the establishment of transnational satellite television channels and the introduction of the internet. These developments constituted a quantum informational leap for a region that had only been exposed to transistor radios, televisions, cassette players and fax machines a decade or two earlier. Also in the 1990s, however, the region experienced a tidal wave of Islamic political activism and extremism. To complicate matters further, two unresolved political crises continued to fester: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the problem of Persian Gulf security. These crises inescapably involved the United States, which was newly-emergent as the world’s most powerful country and theoretically capable of playing an imperial role comparable to that of ancient Rome.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 shocked Americans into the realization that the global environment had indeed changed, not merely from the stable bipolarity of the old Cold War, but even from the apparently new and comfortable world defined by the globalization of everything from finance to culture under undisputed American hegemony. Americans found themselves vulnerable in their very homeland to the assault of Al-Qa`ida, an Islamist network originating, apparently, in the Arab Middle East, but with networked connections in upward of 60 countries (according to the US Defense Department). In response, the American president declared war on terrorism, but this was a new kind of war, an asymmetrical, post-modern war, in which conventional military doctrine and Westphalian assumptions about state actors and geographical boundaries appeared inadequate to the challenge at hand.

It seems appropriate, therefore, to develop some propositions that might help to elucidate the current situation, which remains quite fluid, and to illustrate them with evidence drawn from countries in the Arab East. I begin with a discussion of how the rapid introduction and spread of new information and communications technologies (ICTs) is accelerating the erosion of the state’s ‘monopoly’ over the framing and ratification of identities and loyalties, and the popular perception of public issues. This process is blurring established political boundaries and opening the door to transnational action. In particular, it is having profound consequences for the construction of identities, communities and ideological projects in Arab society at large. Moreover, not only is it deepening the effects of the new American-dominated global order on the domestic and regional Arab scene, but it is also enhancing the reverse flow of influence from the region to the rest of the world, including the United States. Whether the subject is the burgeoning anger in Arab public opinion over American policies, the rise of politicized Islam waging a war of symbols against the West, or―to return to the recent shocks culminating in 11 September―the projection of violent and terroristic force against the United States, it is increasingly clear that the United States cannot remain isolated, for the most part, from the ferment in the contemporary Arab world.

The essay next discusses the changing political terrain in the Arab world, particularly challenges to its states and regimes, the effervescence of its society and the disturbing interventions of America’s new global order. In so doing, I draw attention to the relative weakening of authoritarian regimes in the face of globalization, Islamist ideologies and demands for liberalization and democratization. Notwithstanding these trends, authoritarianism is deeply rooted and authoritarian regimes friendly to the United States have been exempted, especially after 11 September, from Washington’s stated commitment to the expansion of democracy throughout the world. Nevertheless, the interesting and symbiotic coalescence of the new information technologies with the rise of networks is an uncommonly suitable structural response to ingrained authoritarianism and is exerting an influence that has the potential to be quite significant.

Theorists of globalization and the information revolution, such as Castells, depict ‘the rise of the network society’ as a phenomenon driven by a pervasive and peculiarly decentred (dare we say ‘democratizing’?) technology whose impact is perhaps disproportionately felt in societies sufficiently wealthy and technologically advanced to consume―and to produce―the new information technologies. Hence, there is much concern about the ‘digital divide.’ However, as these theorists further observe, the impact is also perceptible in poor and emerging societies and the implications for authoritarian political systems are, in theory, at least, intriguing. To what extent are the societies and states of the Arab world becoming ‘networked’? Networks, one might argue, provide a politically efficacious organizing model for opposition in the authoritarian environment of Arab politics and their political weight has very recently been enhanced by the arrival of transnational satellite television, the internet and cellular telephony. With the new ability to frame (or at least contest the state’s framing of) political agendas, the growing network of opposition groups and ‘non-political’ non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and associations is becoming increasingly effective in contesting the monopoly of state and regime over symbols of legitimacy and established dogmas. For their part, Arab states and regimes are also seeking to utilize the unprecedented networking capabilities offered by the new information technologies.

Network politics in the Arab world is pervasive. It is neither the exclusive provenance of state or society, nor simply a product of the latest information technologies. It knows no particular ideology. Yet, on the contemporary scene, Islamist opposition politicians seem to have been conspicuously effective in exploiting the potentialities of networking. Why is this so? We must look for answers in the breadth and resonance of Islamic symbols, in the perspicacity of Islamist activists to appreciate and utilize the new information technologies and in their ability to generate the social capital necessary to enhance the recruitment and solidarity of Islamist networks, even in the face of high risks.

Finally, what does all of this mean for the persistence of authoritarianism or the possibilities for liberalism―and even democratization―in Arab political systems? Those who are optimistic about possible transitions to democracy in Arab countries must be mindful of the setbacks faced by most of the liberalization or democratization ‘experiments’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, it seems clear that there is no direct or simple causal relationship between the spread of information technologies and the appearance (or deepening) of political openings in the region. Indeed, the widespread use of the new decentred technologies by certain militant Islamist networks with little discernible sympathy for democracy in its literal sense (rule by the people) may perversely have stimulated states and regimes to deploy the same instruments and networking strategies to preserve and extend their monopoly on power. Moreover, it is in no way an apologia for the Arabs’ alleged ‘immunity to democratization’ to observe that the United States government plays a role in the maintenance of several of the region’s authoritarian regimes, sometimes (in the case of ‘friendly’ regimes) by design and sometimes (in the case of ‘rogue’ or ‘evil’ regimes) through counter-productive policies. Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid believing that, eventually, the dominant effect of ICT-enhanced societal networking will be a liberating one.

The information revolution in the Arab world

Just a few years into the Arab world’s information and communications technology revolution, the number of participants has reached impressive levels, both in relation to satellite television and to the internet. Granted that reliable and meaningful numbers are hard to come by, viewership on Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel (ASC) is estimated at 35 million overall, although the audience for specific programs may run in the low to mid-hundreds of thousands, depending on the time of day and the ‘newsworthiness’ of events. It is a global, as well as a regional, media outlet, with tens of thousands of viewers in North America alone. An increasing proportion of viewers―perhaps 30 percent―are women. While audience share trails entertainment-oriented satellite channels like LBC (Lebanese Broadcasting Company) and the state-run channels that exist in many Arab countries, there seems little doubt that Al-Jazeera has a significant, if not predominant, presence within its targeted audience of educated, professionally-oriented individuals in or near the circles of political influence. Moreover, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that Al-Jazeera is ‘must’ watching for leaders, high officials, politicians, diplomats, the intelligentsia, business leaders and ‘opinion-makers’ across the region. As suggested above, it is also thought to have a high degree of saturation among the Arab communities of the diaspora, especially in the United States and Europe.

The numbers just mentioned may not seem impressive in an Arab world of 250 million or more people, but we must bear in mind that they describe a platform for news and opinion comparable to the traditional print news media, yet much more broadly inclusive, although only a scant half-decade old. We must also bear in mind that Al-Jazeera has exerted an imitative effect on other region-wide satellite channels, such as LBC and Al-Mustaqbal (Future Television) of Lebanon, the Abu Dhabi and Dubai channels of the United Arab Emirates, the Saudi-owned MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Center), and Egypt’s Nile and ESC (Egyptian Satellite Channel), as well as others; to some extent, local government-operated stations have also been affected. Of singular importance is the fact that Al-Jazeera and its imitators are significantly more interactive with their audiences than traditional television outlets. This is borne out by the volume of response to on-screen polls and by e-mail messages sent to particular programs, as well as by Al-Jazeera’s stated policy of providing a forum for ‘the other opinion.’

The numbers on the internet side are equally interesting. Recently, there has been a proliferation of Arab portals; according to Jon Anderson, there are now more than 50, with most of them operating in Arabic as well as (or instead of) English. The recently-launched companion to Al-Jazeera television, al-jazeera.net, receives some 300,000 visits a day, making it one of the Arab world’s busiest websites. When it invites its ‘community’ to participate in online polling on Islam, current affairs, sports, or the like, it will pull in 20,000-35,000 ‘votes.’ It is important to underline the interactive behaviour of the web audience as a factor in the construction of identity and communal solidarity. Consider, too, that similar ‘publicly-oriented’ websites, such as those established by major print newspapers, not to mention portals catering to a particular ideological tendency (such as radical Islam) or material interest (such as music, fashion, or business) are also drawing―and no doubt expanding―publicly-active online communities.

The Arab Information Project, which was established at Georgetown University in 1995 under the direction of myself and Jon Anderson, has been studying the implantation of the internet in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.2 Contrary to initial hypotheses that the regimes in these states, which are authoritarian to varying degrees, would seek to inhibit an intrinsically pluralistic and liberal ICT development, it was found that the top leadership in all cases took the lead in encouraging it. Even though the more controlling regimes (Saudi Arabia and Syria) sought to centralize (and censor) internet availability to some extent, they seemed to acknowledge the necessity of internet capability for the sake of economic and business development, as well as the practical obstacles to the total suppression of unwanted access and material. In Jordan, with its particularly delicate internal situation, the economic benefits of a liberal ICT regime were clearly seen to outweigh the political security costs. And while Islamist groups have been quick to grasp the political significance of ICT, established governments with a relatively secular orientation have perceived the countervailing benefits of a liberal ICT and media policy for the socialization of young people, in particular, into a broader cultural framework.

The changing political terrain in the Arab world

From the post-World War II period until almost the present, the state has steadily emerged as the dominant feature in the Arab political landscape. It has grown dramatically in terms of size, revenues and coercive capacity. At an early stage, it also enjoyed a certain legitimacy derived from the successful struggle against Western imperialism in its various forms.

One group of Arab states embarked upon a nationalist-reformist project, led mainly by military officers and a professional, reform-minded middle-class stratum. The authoritarian-populist regimes in these states framed public priorities in terms of economic development through import-substitution-industrialization, egalitarianism through land reform and emasculation of the very wealthy, and mobilization to unify the Arab nation, redress the grievous nakba (catastrophe) of Palestine and prevent Western neo-imperialist designs on the Arab region. For these regimes, the Soviet Union became a counterpoise to Western encroachment and, to some extent, a model for political and economic development. Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Iraq and North and South Yemen pursued this course in their various ways.

A second group, while passively accepting much of the nationalist project, including the leading role of the state, possessed regimes with an avowedly ‘traditional’ and ‘patriarchal’ character. These included Saudi Arabia, the smaller states of the Arabian peninsula, and Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco. Unlike the ‘nationalists,’ most of these regimes celebrated their Islamic authenticity rather than relegating it to a lower priority (the exception being Lebanon, where the confessional political system institutionalized both the Muslim and Christian religious traditions). Many were rentier-states―major oil exporters whose vast revenues accrued directly to the state or to the dynastic regimes. Their affluent classes were co-opted, rather than suppressed, and harnessed to non-‘socialist’ development plans; and their external orientation favoured the West as a bulwark against the challenges posed by the transnational ideological appeal of the ‘progressive’ states.

However, both groups of states practiced, to varying degrees, a monolithic populist mobilization strategy. Political liberalization, let alone pluralistic democracy, was not on the agenda. The state led, framing the public agenda; society followed, deferentially and passively. Yet, despite its dominance domestically, the post-colonial Arab state and state system came to occupy a subordinate position in the postwar bipolar superpower-dominated global order. As pan-Arabism waned, following the defeat of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel-Nasser in the 1967 war with Israel, some Middle East specialists observed what they believed to be a ‘maturing’ of the Arab state system: individual states were becoming more autonomous, self-contained, self-interested, Weberian and Westphalian. The states of the region were behaving in accordance with structural-realist international relations theory, as rational self-help units pragmatically sensitive to the global distribution of power. From the perspective of the two rival superpowers, the Middle East was a contested region in which each constructed client blocs that came to mimic their patrons in what Middle East scholar Malcolm Kerr called “the Arab Cold War.”

The global and regional terrain started to shift in the 1980s. States that had seemed to dominate their societies began to falter, unable to continue delivering on the socio-economic promises that had tacitly fostered political passivity. A long period of economic growth came to an end with the collapse of oil prices in the middle of the decade. The oil-rich rentier regimes experienced huge revenue declines. The nationalist-progressive ideological formulas of other regimes began to fade. And the bipolar global order came to an end with the eclipse and demise of the Soviet Union, leaving the United States the hegemon of an increasingly integrated global economy and financial system informed by an ascendant ideology of economic and political liberalism. International financial institutions, heavily influenced by the United States, came to intervene in the most sensitive of domestic policy issues in countries around the world, including most Arab and Islamic ones. In the military sphere, where only the United States possessed a global reach, ‘humanitarian interventions’ (even failed ones) served notice on dictators that the ‘international community’ might intrude militarily against regimes whose internal policies egregiously violated ‘international standards.’ The exercise of Westphalian sovereignty was being undermined everywhere.

Across the Arab world, then, states began to weaken, relatively speaking. At the same time, societies began to display greater vitality than before, with associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emerging during the 1980s to articulate alternative agendas and priorities, although rarely to participate in the policy-making process. Political scientists observed the new trend and produced a number of studies depicting the growth of what Norton (1993, 216) describes as more “vibrant” political societies, while also subjecting the once all-powerful, stable mukhabarat (police) state to revisionist interpretations―with perhaps the most cogent appearing in Nazih Ayubi’s book, Over-Stating the Arab State (1995). But it was far from clear where the new societal energy would lead. While a stratum of intellectuals and business leaders sought to advance projects of political liberalization and democratization, these efforts were apparently unsuccessful in garnering a broad popular constituency. The far more rooted societal tendency belonged to the Islamists.

On a broader level, as the leader of a new global order, the United States struggled to define its role in the 1990s, leaning first toward ‘umpire’ during the administration of Bill Clinton and then toward ‘empire’ during George W. Bush’s initial year in office. America’s overarching presence in the Middle East (particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union) owing to its oil connection and its support for Israel, meant that the direction of American policy could only have a major impact on the region’s states and societies. But, by the same token, developments in the region could not be long ignored in Washington, especially if they spilled over into the United States itself. Against this backdrop of weakening states, societal ferment and the new global order, the twin developments of transnational information technologies and political networking in the Arab world have the potential to accelerate socio-political change, contestation and uncertainty.

Networks and new modalities of contestation

In today’s Information Age, says Castells, “[n]etworks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture” (2000, 500). He continues:

A network is a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point at which a curve intersects itself. What a node is, concretely speaking, depends on the kind of concrete networks of which we speak. . . . Networks are open structures, able to expand without limits, integrating new nodes as long as they are able to communicate within the network, namely as long as they share the same communication codes (for example, values or performance goals) (501).

An integral part of the network structure or, more precisely, the network experience, is the potential for the production, consumption and investment of social capital. In a decisive article, Coleman (2000) states that social capital is defined by its function, that it is productive (allowing “the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible”) and that it differs from other forms of capital because it “inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (16). He offers examples of culturally-bound (networked) communities, such as the wholesale diamond market or the Cairo bazaar, in which a sense of community engenders trust and, thus, promotes collectively productive action. The informal hawwala money-transfer networks, now infamous for their alleged role in supporting Al-Qa`ida, constitute a similar example. Thus, social capital and networking are not confined to modern societies with formal rules and institutions: they also operate in what Rose (2000), referring to Russia, calls anti-modern societies, providing channels to ‘get things done’ when formal institutions do not work.

Notwithstanding our current preoccupation with high-tech networks and ‘netwars’ (as Ronfeldt and Arquilla use the term), we tend to forget that Arab society has always been permeated with networks that function in a variety of areas. In his valuable comparative study of informal networks in Egypt, Iran and Lebanon, Denoeux argues that such networks can promote either political stability or instability. They are capable of absorbing the dysfunctional social atomization and personal anomie that might otherwise cause disruptions in fast-modernizing societies with repressive governments. But, by the same token, these social dislocations can lead to the formation of networks based upon alternatives to the official vision of society and, thus, come to challenge the political order. The question is, then, at what point do they become a force for change, rather than a means to reinforce the status quo?

As noted above, the development of the Arab state in the post-colonial period took an authoritarian turn at almost every juncture. Although socio-economic development began to establish infrastructures capable of supporting vibrant civil societies, insecure regimes, avaricious élites, ideological demands and international influences converged to create mukhabarat states suspicious of societal autonomy, pluralism and alternative agendas. Consequently, political parties (other than the official ones sponsored by regimes) were weak, elections (when they occurred) were usually rubber-stamp affairs, and interest groups, labour unions and the like came under constant government surveillance and interference. The mass media, too, with certain significant exceptions, were co-opted into helping to frame the state’s political agenda. The rule of law was too feeble to protect civil and political space, while the bureaucracies of state-driven economies became known for opaqueness, inefficiency and corruption. In short, the formal political structures of a lively and participatory civil society were absent. Significant opposition, even if it professed to be loyal to the system, was forced, to some degree, to be clandestine or at least very discreet. Is it surprising, then, that such alternative currents as could survive adopted formal and informal network structures and cultures?

When political parties were banned in Egypt during the Nasser era, the two main opposition currents, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party, were soon forced to operate clandestinely. Powerful families and social networks (shillas) became key and influential players in the absence of formal political organizations (Springborg 1982). Beneath the surface of high politics (oriented around the central government), informal political networks coalesced in the poor quarters of Cairo and other cities and in the villages of Upper Egypt to cope with important issues related to family and marriage, employment and education, and social services (Singerman 1995).

In Bilad al-Sham and Mesopotamia, where ‘new’ states―Syria, Transjordan, Palestine (a non-state national community), Lebanon and Iraq― were constructed mostly from the outside, political networks took on a transnational quality as well. Examples include the Ba`th Party in all of these countries (before it became a ruling hierarchical-bureaucratic party in Syria and Iraq); the Muslim Brotherhood, spun off into satellites of the original Egyptian organization; the Arab Nationalists’ Movement; the Communist Party; the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of ‘Greater Syria’; and the Palestinian resistance movement with its numerous networked factions (in its early incarnation from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s). Lebanon, the one Arab state that was relatively non-authoritarian, possessed legal parties and held regular elections; yet, even there, perhaps owing to Lebanon’s highly plural society, formal political parties were weak and were organized, more often than not, as informal networks of notables and their clienteles, usually within sectarian or regional frameworks. The Lebanese (Maronite) Phalange Party emerged out of a quasi-fascist youth organization. The (Druze) Progressive Socialist Party derived its cohesion and influence from dominant family networks (the Junblats and Arslans). When the state collapsed into a civil war (with significant transnational features) that continued from 1975 to 1990, Lebanon became a ‘republic’ of networked militias.

In the Arabian peninsula, where family- and tribal-based patrimonial systems framed the political agenda, political parties were illegal and elections almost non-existent. Yet, a societal-based traditional pluralism did exist through the informal political networks of the diwaniyya in Kuwait, the majlis in Saudi Arabia and the mafraj in Yemen. Arabian networks were also functionally differentiated according to occupational (for example, business), religious, educational and social interests. Moreover, after 11 September, greater attention has been given to the formidable social capital and network flows (to use Castells’ term) that seem to inhere in militant Islamist networks.

Explaining network success: The specific case of Islamist networks

Islamist networks seem to be particularly successful. But why? Future researchers attempting to explain this phenomenon might ask themselves the following four questions. First, how potent and socially pervasive is the symbolic content of the value agenda framed by Islamist leaders? Second, how do they recruit, retain and deepen the commitment of network members? Third, to what extent can they build upon, and benefit from, existing kinship, occupational, educational, or financial networks? And fourth, does the information technology revolution allow political networks to extend their reach beyond face-to-face relationships; or, to put it another way, can social capital (and trust) travel through cyberspace?

This is not the place for an attempt to provide exhaustive answers to these questions. But a casual survey of formal Islamist political networks, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and less formal or even clandestine movements, such as the Egyptian gama`at, the Shi`a networks of Lebanon, Iran and Iraq, the Palestinian Islamist groups, the Islamist organizations of North Africa, and even the notorious Al-Qa`ida, suggests that they can advance their agendas in all of the ways just described.

First, with respect to the symbolic agenda, one does not have to go as far as some authors, who claim that all contemporary Arab political discourse has become Islamicized, to observe that the array of programs and projects encapsulated by the slogan, “Islam is the Solution,” resonates deeply with individuals mired in the tensions and contradictions of contemporary Arab societies. Moreover, the pervasiveness of these symbols, especially when associated with long-standing nationalist concerns, extends throughout society and is not restricted to Islamist groups. Thus, an Islamist network like Al-Qa`ida swims in a nutritious societal ‘sea.’ This is why it is incorrect to designate Al-Qa`ida a cult and why, despite its execution of morally atrocious acts, it enjoys at least passive support across social strata and also transnationally.

Second, as Wickham (1998) has observed in her study of Islamists in Egypt, (which draws upon the work of such social movement theorists as Douglas McAdam), the network itself produces the social capital rewards for membership, in addition to the instrumental agendas being put forth. Codes of dress and deportment are among the social cues―and pressures―that attract and consolidate commitment to the cause. During repressive periods in the regimes of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Islamists migrated into society’s subaltern and protected spaces to find sanctuary and launch new initiatives to permit them to participate in high politics.

Third, Islamist networks appear to be able to take advantage of pre-existing social and cultural networks. Al-Qa`ida, as noted above, may ride upon the shoulders of the hawwala financial networks. Some say that it free rides on Arabian honey-trading networks. Did Usama bin Laden’s family and business networks indirectly enable the development of his political network? Islamist networks appear to originate in ‘old boys’ clubs’ connected to schools and universities. The Taliban’s founders may have been alumni of the Deobandi seminary. The Shi`a network organizers of Amal, Hizballah and the Da`wa still form lasting bonds in the seminaries of Qom and Najaf. Egyptian Islamists may have first crossed paths at Al-Azhar. American Muslim extremists networked in the storefront mosques of Jersey City and Brooklyn. Non-Islamist opposition networks may also superimpose themselves upon pre-existing networks. Hanna Batatu’s meticulous work on the Iraqi Communists and the Syrian Ba`thists reveals their sectarian and regional interconnections. The founders of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Arab Nationalists’ Movement may have utilized the alumni and student networks of the American University of Beirut as platforms for their own transnational political projects.

Finally, it appears quite likely that the internet and the satellite television networks will vastly extend the global reach of transnational Islamist (and non-Islamist) networks. Whether it is Shaykh Qaradawi’s call-in program on Al-Jazeera or the substantial communities constructed electronically around the Islam Online internet portal, these communities in cyberspace, as Jon Anderson has described them, may constitute an enormous pool for future recruitment by dedicated political networks.

American assertiveness after 11 September

According to all traditional measures of power, the United States today holds the world in the palm of its hand. As Brooks and Wohlforth observe, there is no counterbalancing power or bloc that can compel Washington to refrain from acting as it wishes in the international arena. The Bush administration is dominated by a neo-conservative ‘hawkish’ tendency that is comfortable with the burdens of empire and that stubbornly insists that great power must be exercised in order to be effective. Neo-conservatives are Manichean in their conceptualizations of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ international actors. They call for the summary punishment of the evildoers and are impatient toward―if not downright contemptuous of―traditional allies in Europe and Japan. Multilateral ventures are desirable, to be sure―consider Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s strategy to build floating coalitions in the war on terrorism―but unilateralism must never be ruled out when core American interests are at stake. Opposing the neo-conservatives are the liberal internationalists, who argue that, in time, arrogance and unilateralism will prove costly to the United States, even if not fatally so. (Critics from the left, such as Noam Chomsky and Edward Said, appear to be almost completely marginalized.) Within the American administration, this outlook is most closely identified with Secretary Colin Powell and other key State Department officials; Richard Haass’ attempt to articulate a ‘doctrine’ of integration exemplifies this ‘softer’ approach. But it appears that these softliners have been eclipsed by hawkish officials in the Pentagon, the vice-president’s office and the Congress, aided and abetted by a jingoistic chorus from conservative journals, newspaper opinion pages and cable news channels.

In comparison to most other parts of the world, the Arab and Islamic regions are particularly weak vis-à-vis the United States and their governments are substantially dependent upon it economically, for security and for the enhancement of their own technological capacity. Yet, anyone who follows American politics, especially since 11 September, cannot fail to observe Washington’s fear, anger and frustration in relation to the region. Indeed, official Washington identifies it as the enemy’s heartland in the ‘war on terrorism.’ The domestic dimension of this war focuses on the ethnic-religious profiling of Arabs and Muslims; the foreign dimension focuses upon ‘terrorist groups with global reach,’ most of which are seen to be based in the region, notwithstanding their presence in up to 60 countries. Two-thirds of the tripartite ‘axis of evil’ are Middle Eastern states. Iraq has recently been named as the next military target after Afghanistan. Influential neo-conservative voices cast Saudi Arabia as an enemy, not a friend. Along with Al-Qa`ida, a number of Arab ‘terrorist’ organizations, including Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have been singled out by President Bush. Most significantly, the president appears to have accepted the Sharon government’s conflation of its ‘war against Palestinian terrorism’ with America’s war against global terrorism.

From Washington’s imperial perspective, the anti-American hostility of civil society and public opinion in the Arab world counts for little, so there is no reason to return to diplomacy to settle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict before launching the next military campaign in the ‘war on terrorism,’ this time against Iraq. This neo-conservative stance dovetails seamlessly with the agenda of Israel’s lobby in the United States and is reflected, as well, in the Republican Party (which is now seriously challenging the Democrats for the Jewish vote) and in the fundamentalist Christian churches. As a result, public opinion throughout the Muslim world―and especially in the Arab countries―now considers the United States an enemy and its ‘war on terrorism’ a euphemism for war against Islam and the Arabs. Because the more intemperate imperialists in the American political establishment call for ‘democracy’ in a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq and in other Arab countries, the advocates of genuine democracy in the Arab world have suffered a setback, while those advocating extremist responses to the American presence have gained ground. The information revolution in the Arab world has undoubtedly strengthened anti-American opinion and the United States government, belatedly trying to counter its negative image with its own media projects, such as Radio Sawa, realizes that it is fighting an uphill battle.

Some tentative conclusions

What do these developments mean for Arab politics, the prospects for political liberalization, the future of oppositional networked movements and regional stability in general? I conclude with the following ten propositions for further reflection and research:

1 Information and communications technologies―and the internet, in particular―allow for the easy establishment and proliferation of electronic ‘newspapers’ that may perform many of the traditional political functions of the print news media. In the Arab world, many political parties were essentially built around newspapers.

2 ICT also permits ‘other voices’ to affect ruling circles by diffusing their messages globally. An NGO with an internet site or access to satellite broadcasters gains attention―and influence―in local power centres by channeling its content through centres of global power and legitimation. The leverage of a human rights group lies in the ‘value added’ that its message picks up by being bounced off of Washington or Geneva.

3 Putting this in terms familiar to American political scientists, one might say that, as a potential ‘fourth estate’ in Arab political systems, the press has gained new power and dynamism through the internet and satellite television.

4 Both Islamists and the still greater number of Muslims whose activism is not politically directed seem far ahead of other Arab groups in exploiting the possibilities of ICT. Why? Perhaps it is because their websites and broadcasts can speak to a well-defined and motivated community of believers, while more abstracted ideological projects (secular socialism and liberalism) make demands on their potential audience that cannot be matched by action.

5 The ICT revolution in the Arab world seems to be favouring the development of an expanded national and transnational public sphere, as well as the civil society NGOs and networks associated with it, at the relative expense of the state and authoritarian regimes. State-run television is being challenged by the growing number of transnational satellite channels and forced to enrich and enliven its programming. Anecdotal evidence indicates that internet usage is apparently growing rapidly after an uncertain start and is generating a new generation of ‘chatters,’ notably, youth and women, even in those countries with highly defensive internet policies. To be sure, the administrative capacity of state bureaucracies, including the security services, is enhanced by ICTs as well, but it is the societal impact―and potential―of ICTs that shows the most promise of moving the Arab world toward stronger knowledge-based societies, as the recent Arab Human Development Report recommends.

6 The information revolution is driving a reconstruction of Arab identity. It is not merely the ‘Al-Jazeera effect’ that is creating a new transnational public space for Arabs to converse, debate and inform one another (much to the distress of some American and Israeli neo-conservative intellectuals) in Arabic, but also the more interactive medium of the internet, which is facilitating communal consciousness within (initially, at least) the relatively affluent articulate strata. A new Arabism is emerging, in part due to the increasingly rapid implantation of ICT, which confronts Arabs with the starkness of their shared problems and the hostile intrusiveness of the United States, especially since 11 September.

7 ICT also is helping in the construction of other more robust political identities as well. Minority sectarian and ethnic communities facing discrimination now use the internet to enhance their own solidarity and to build supportive transnational constituencies. Lebanese Christian and Kurdish opposition organizations, for example, find ICT exerting a kind of multiplier effect on their power and influence. One might further expect women from different countries across the region to take advantage of ICT proliferation to enhance their own solidarity as they struggle for greater participation in public life.

8 ICT expansion is slowly, but surely, loosening the grip of authoritarian regimes over states and societies. Even though there is scant evidence of any significant relaxation of control in the years―less than a decade―since the rise of satellite television and the internet, the proliferation of new electronic voices, which can only be silenced with difficulty, is forcing power-holders to interact with these independent ‘centres of influence’ (if not power). Inevitably, they will provide a platform for those who wish to challenge the opaqueness and patrimonialism of ruling élites.

9 Quite apart from its enabling effects on civil society, ICT is directly influencing political and other élites at the highest levels. Research on internet implantation in four Arab countries by the Georgetown Arab Information Project shows how heads of state (notably, in Jordan and Syria) have become personally engaged in ICT development and how they realize that a knowledge-based pluralistic society is essential for economic development in a globalized world. Even the angry response of certain rulers to the opinions expressed by some commentators on Al-Jazeera implicitly admits the influence of the new media. Nor should we underestimate the ‘subversive’ effects of ICT on the children of power-holders.

10 America’s effect on this volatile cocktail of ICT implantation, upheavals in political structures and rising Islamist networks is likely to be quite destabilizing. On the socio-economic level, globalization―with its strong American accent―is imposing dynamic innovations with positive developmental implications, but also stark challenges to the existing sluggish economic order. On the political level, the American administration is today acting as if it intends to overthrow the existing order. Its current support for the actions of a reckless and extremist Israeli regime against Palestinians is like throwing fuel on a fire that is already raging out of control. And America’s confrontation with Arab and Islamic public opinion through its conduct of the ‘war on terrorism’ and its new doctrine of preventive warfare―soon, it seems, to be tested on Iraq―appears almost calculated to incubate new Islamist and nationalist terrorist networks bent upon targeting the United States at home and abroad.

Notes

1 This essay is based upon a paper originally presented at a conference on “The Impact of Transnational Processes,” sponsored by the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, Amman, Jordan, in June 2001.

2 The Georgetown University Arab Information Project, located at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, may be viewed online by going to <www.ccasonline.org> or <www.georgetown.edu/ research/arabtech>.

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